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1. Introduction 
In the late seventies, John Friedmann made an attempt to formulate a 
new paradigm for regional development. His basic proposition was 
that the then prevailing development paradigm had been dominated 
by functional integration (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979). The integri-
ty of local territorial life had been surrendered in the interests of 
growth and efficiency. Efficient large-scale functional organisation 
meant centralisation at higher levels. The trans-national corporation 
was seen as the ultimate embodiment of this approach. In his view 
regional planning was at a crossroads; it would have to choose 
between function and territory. He subsequently formulatedthe'devel-
opment of territory as an alternative paradigm. As a guiding principle 
this was more egalitarian, distributive and integrative, including eco-
nomic, social as well as political dimensions of development. 
Friedmann and Weaver's book received a mixed reception. One of the 
critiques was by Jos Hilhorst, my predecessor (Hilhorst, 1980). The 
formulation of function and territory as two opposites had, in his 
view, a number of basic flaws. Subsequent developments in the liter-
ature have proven Hilhorst to be right in a number of respects. The 
interaction between function and territory became, in the late eighties 
and early nineties, an important dimension of localised economic 
growth and embedded development. 
It may seem remarkable that in the current era of the globalisation of 
activities, flows and markets, territorial embeddedness is receiving so 
much attention. 'While capital, raw materials, components and end 
. products move rapidly and cheaply over the surface of the earth, only 
human beings and human social institutions seem to meet fundamen-
tal barriers to mobility and replication' (Maskell, et.al.,1998:179). 
The quality of labour, knowledge and social institutions have become 
fundamental to explaining local economic development. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the factors that have 
strengthened the interaction between function and territory. In this 
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paper I intend to review three factors, namely, external economies, 
processes of learning and collective learning and governance. I will 
begin with external economies, starting with the work of Paul 
Krugman, which has become known as geographical economics. 
Then I will examine the manner in which the 'New Industrial District' 
literature has conceptualised the contribution of external economies. 
After having pointed out some of common elements and key differ-
ences between these two different schools of thought, I will move to 
examine the second source of localised economic growth, namely 
processes of learning and collective learning. In order to do so, I will 
briefly elaborate on the evolutionary perspective. Processes of learn-
ingand collective learning take place at the level of firms and of net-
works of firms. Learning and collective learning can achieve higher 
levels of innovative capability when organised at the level of territo-
ry or the milieu. This brings me to the third factor, namely gover-
nance. Innovations in economic governance constitute one of the rad-
ical changes of our times. The 'modern' corporation was the focus of 
attention in the early and mid-20th century. In the last few decades 
inter-firm and extra-firm organisation have been subject to innova-
tion. New institutional devices are based on the notions of product 
column, commodity chain, cluster and milieu. These innovations 
introduce new issues of economic governance not only at the level of 
the firm and industry but also at the level of territory. 
In a final section, I will look at some implications for development 
policy. :The more a local regional economy is capable of achieving 
greater coherence between changes required at the level of its firms 
and clusters and of the relevant local institutions, talting into account 
the needs of local population, the better it will be able to set out on or 
maintain itself on a sustainable development trajectory. In essence, 
local economic development is about developing and enhancing the 
performance of institutions, both functional and territorial. 
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2. External economies 
2.1 A 'geographical economics' view 
Krugman is one of the leading economists who have contributed to 
the growing recognition of the localised nature of economic growth. 
His work stands somewhat apart from that of others and has been 
given the label of geographical economics. He considers the incorpo-
ration of space as the fourth (and possibly final) wave of the increas-
ing returns/imperfect competition revolution. The first came with 
industria:! organisation, the second is new trade theory and the third 
new growth theory (Krugman, 1998a). He argued that to understand 
international trade, one must begin to understand why industries tend 
to concentrate geographically. Generally firms will locate in areas 
with the largest demand. Because of the potential for increasing 
returns, generated by economies of scale, firms prefer to supply other 
areas from this initial location. Sufficiently low transport costs will 
malce this possible. The area of largest demand will draw other firms, 
which adopt the same logic, and this reinforces its attractiveness. 
Producers will prefer to locate there, where the demand is large and 
where the supply of inputs is particularly convenient. The agglomer-
ation of economic activity reflects processes of cumulative circular 
causation whereby 'activities tend to cluster where markets are large 
and markets become larger there where activities cluster' (Krugman, 
1995). Factor mobility further contributes to circular cumulative cau-
sation where centre regions grow at the expense of peripheral ones. 
The larger the potential economies of scale, and the lower the trans-
.port costs, the stronger will be the tendency towards agglomeration of 
production. Economies of scale are the principal cause of concentra-
tion. This phenomenon is considered to occur primarily at the inter-
regional level, consisting of large economic units (Krugman, 
1991a:70/1). 
Krugman considered another process of agglomeration, namely, that 
based on external economies. This process occurs primarily at the 
local level. The author relies on the classical Marshallian type of 
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external economies. Firstly, labour market pooling. Agglomeration is 
attractive for workers with specialised sldUs as pooling permits them 
to switch employers, while firms are able to recruit additional work-
ers. Under conditions of increasing returns to scale and knowledge 
uncertainty both can benefitl. A second source of external economies 
is generated by specialist inputs and services. Assuming economies of 
scale, specialist inputs can be made at higher scales in a cluster of 
firms. Thanks to the larger size, specialists can also support a greater 
range of inputs. These are called market size effects. They operate 
through both backward and forward linkages. The third source of 
external economies are lmowledge and information flows. A concen-
tration of firms facilitates the flow of information and lmowledge 
exchange. These are considered to be pure or technological lmowl-
edge spillovers. Krugman excludes these from his models with the 
argument that lmowledge flows cannot be easily traced. These three 
sources of external economy constitute centripetal forces that gener-
ate geographical concentration. Like Myrdal (1957) and other distin-
guished predecessors, Krugman recognises centrifugal forces, which 
tend to disperse economic activity. Here he refers in particular to 
immobile factors, to land rents and to pure external diseconomies 
(Krugman, 1998a, 1998b). 
In his early work (Krugman, 1991a, 1995), Krugman stressed the 
importance of the market size effect as contributing to geographical 
concentration. In his more recent work, he expects this to be less 
importaNt than other sources of agglomeration at least in as far as 
cities are concerned. 'Big cities may be sustained by increasing 
returns that are due to thick labor markets, or to localised lmowledge 
spillovers, rather than those emerging from the interaction of trans-
port costs and scale economies at the plant level' (Krugman, 1998a). 
The specialisation of an area in a particular industry may itself be an 
historical accident. Whatever the reason for the initial location of a 
cluster, once a pattern of specialisation is established, increasing 
returns set in and the pattern of specialisation becomes 'locked in' by 
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cumulative gains from trade. There is strong path dependence in the 
pattern of specialisation and of trade. Trade and location are integrat-
ed. 
If transport costs fell even more, firms could disperse, as the need to 
cluster would fall away. However, regions that have had a head start2, 
in the sense that specialisation in an industry is advanced, will attract 
industries and grow away from other locations with less favourable 
conditions. The lock-in towards greater specialisation also has its neg-
ative side, as we will see beIow. 
The reduction of transport cost in effect may have asymmetrical 
effects. It will not debilitate concentrations of industries, which expe-
rience increasing returns and will be able to continue to grow. But 
lower transport costs will reduce the geographical protection offered 
by distance to firms in less favoured regions with smaller markets. 
The selective build up of transport infrastructure (towards dendritic 
systems) further reinforces this asymmetry. 
The models designed by Krugman typically generate multiple equi-
libria, representing different 'imaginary histories'. Most, though not 
all, are two-region models. A small change in one of the critical vari-
ables, e.g. transport costs, can produce swift changes in the distribu-
tion of activities between the two regions, differentiating them into a 
core containing mobile industry and a periphery containing agricul-
ture. Thus, some land of spatial structure is spontaneously defined, 
usually with a highly. uneven distribution of economic activity, in 
spite of initially similar natural endowments. Changes are qualitative 
and often discontinuous as a result of quantitative changes in under-
lying parameters (Krugman, 1998a: 12). 
When an industry happens to get a head start in a particular region, 
increasing returns may set in, which 'lock' the region into that growth 
path. It will continue to specialise in that industry. This specialisation 
has accumulative advantages but it may also have disadvantages. The 
region may 'overspecialise', organising all its resources and institu-
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tions around that particular industry and this may in turn lead to a cer-
tain 'crowding out' of or lack of attention to other industries. 
Specialisation may malce regions prone to random external shocks. 
Shifts in demand may render the entire industrial base of a region 
obsolete. The shifting of capital and labour to new industries repre-
sents a major investment for which they may deserve, according to 
Krugman, some compensation. Also the ensuing unemployment prob-
lem may call for a slower adjustment process. Thus, while specialisa-
tion may have advantages, vulnerability is the other side of the coin. 
2.2 New industrial geography: industrial districts 
The literature on new industrial districts (NIDs) has its origin in the 
mid-eighties3• Amidst industrial decline, large-scale industrial restruc-
turing and re-Iocation of industries to low cost regions and countries, 
some regions in Europe and the USA demonstrated strong industrial 
dynamism, based on new flexible technologies and small and medi-
um firms. Most of the initial NID literature draws on experiences of 
successful districts in Europe (such as the Third Italy or Baden-
Wurtumberg in Germany). Subsequent research revealed the exis-
tence of clusters in a number of developing countries. Well-docu-
mented case,s are found in Brazil (Schmitz, 1995a, and 1999b), 
Mexico (Rabellotti, 1995, and 1999), Peru (Visser, 1996, and 1999) 
and India (Knorringa, 1996 and 1999; Das, 1998; Cawthorne, 1995). 
Industrial districts span a diversity of sectors that range from basic 
consumer goods, such as shoes, clothing and knitwear, to intermedi-
ate products and consumer durable goods. 
Piore and Sabel had a strong influence on the early formulation of the 
NID framework. They argued that mass production had reached its 
limits as the dominant industrial model. Flexible specialisation would 
be capable to challenge large-scale 'fordist' production (Pi ore and 
Sabel, 1984). The two models were seen as polar opposites whereby 
mass production uses special purpose dedicated machine, technology, 
operated by semi-skilled workers. Specialisation, driven:by this tech-
nology, increasingly refines the tasks of workers (de-skilling) in an 
6 
extended hierarchical internal division of labour (where the assembly 
line constitutes the organising device, hence the name fordist produc-
tion). Re-tooling of these increasingly complex operations is time 
consuming and expensive and therefore production runs have to be 
very large. Homogeneous products and price competition are preva-
lent. In contrast, flexible specialisation is based on the manufacture of 
custom-made products using multi-purpose technology and flexible 
production methods, operated by skilled workers. Production runs can 
be small as re-tooling times are short and costs are low. As a result 
products can become differentiated. Innovation into product designs 
becomes a challenge and a way to avoid price competition. While 
'fordist' production needs stable and homogenous mass markets, flex-
ible specialisation thrives in rapidly changing and niche markets. 
Large-scale fordist production is characterised by internal economies 
of scale and scope. Economies of scope arise with the variety of tasks 
within a firm or plant. The larger the unit the better these different 
tasks may be combined and recombined. Clusters of flexibly spe-
cialised small and medium firms, at the other extreme, derive their 
strengths from external economies of scale and scope. Rather than 
organising an entire production process within its own plant(s), a firm 
can opt to rely on other firms, which specialise in the manufacture of 
certain components or sub-processes and which are able to produce 
these in a variety of specifications. The firm can specialise in its own 
products, components or sub-processes, serving not only its own 
requirements but also that of the other firms. It is advantageous for 
. small firms to specialise, and the division of labour between firms 
advances progressively. Inter-firm subcontracting constitutes the 
basis of sectoral specialisation. The gains from specialisation by indi-
vidual firms generate externalities for the cluster as a whole and spill 
over into lower costs. In addition, the deepening of the division of 
labour within a cluster helps to generate external economies of scope. 
These arise when the variety of producers within the cluster increas-
es, enabling new combinations of inputs generating new products. 
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According to Piore and Sabel, there were already a number of indus-
trial districts where flexible specialisation had taken root in small 
firms and which had begun to challenge mass production. The success 
of the small firms was in some instances based on long traditions of 
craftsmanship in the manufacture of custom-made and design-inten-
sive products. The emergence of new flexible specialisation tech-
nologies of automated machines permitted these firms to respond 
more flexibly to demand-based changes in product specification (cf 
Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sengenberger and Pyke, 1991, Pedersen et al, 
1994). 
Others recognise that large firms, facing growing uncertainty of 
demand in more competitive markets, also have to restructure as 
internal economies of scale and scope no longer sufficiently compen-
sate for these risks. The firms then have several options. They can 
relocate production to low-wage regions and countries, giving rise to 
the so-called 'new international division of labour' whereby intra-
firm trade constitutes a growing proportion of international trade. 
Another option would be to raise flexibility, through vertical disinte-
gration. By externalising and subcontracting the production of diverse 
inputs, large firms can spread the risks of fluctuating and changing 
demand. This process, whereby internal economies give way to exter-
nal ones through a progressive externalisation of the structure of pro-
duction will, according to Scott (1988), lead to re-agglomeration and 
Iocational convergence of specialised producers. Vertical disintegra-
tion multiplies the number of transactions between firms, leading to 
higher transaction costs. Producers can counteract this by increasing 
proximity, giving rise to further spatial concentration. 
There are, therefore, two routes towards (re-) agglomeration. One is 
via the growth of SME clusters. External economies, hitherto unavail-
able, emerge thanks to new technology. The other route is through the 
re-organisation of large firms. Here, internal economies generated 
. within the firm give way to external ones. De-agglomeration of indus-
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try only occurs when firms move away to low-cost regions and coun-
tries. 
Soon doubts emerged about the capacity of flexible, specialised, small 
firm to challenge large-scale 'fordist giants'. Piore and Sabel and their 
followers were quite explicit about this. Others, like Williams (1987) 
and Asheim (1992), took more refined views (for more details, see 
Helmsing, 1999a). Suffice to state here that there are other ways of 
achieving flexible production than small-scale flexible specialisation; 
and these need not imply the disappearance of all internal economies 
of scale. Large firms may make use of flexible production methods, 
to reorganise their assembly systems, enhance organisational flexibil-
ity, decentralise production and increase labour flexibility. But even if 
large firms vertically disintegrate production, this does not imply the 
disappearance of economies of scale and scope in marketing, distrib-
ution and control. To put it differently, even if flexible specialisation 
constituted the end of 'fordism' as a particular form of organising 
large-scale production, it would not imply the disappearance of large 
firms. 
Asheim makes the important point that flexible specialisation tech-
nology has made flexible production methods also available in the 
realm of small firms. 'A new feature in the history of capitalist indus-
trial development is the opportunities opened for small firms to 
engage in diver~ified quality production where a high degree of flex-
ibility and efficiency in the production of specialised (semi-cus-
tomised or customised) quality competitive products are attained 
. through a small firm's new ability to change promptly from one prod-
uct or process configuration to another, due to the availability on the 
market of relatively cheap re-programmable computerised production 
equipment' (Asheim, 1992: 50). Flexible specialisation here has a 
restricted meaning and refers to 'this new form of production organi-
sation, which, based on flexible multi-use production techniques and 
skilled workers, has resulted in a new competitive market situation for 
independent small firms' (ibid, p 50, emphasis mine). 
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Without referring to new trade theory, Storper (1990: 432) adds the 
interesting point that exports are a necessary corollary of flexible spe-
cialisation. The greater inter-penetration of markets that have become 
contestable as a result of liberalisation creates higher risks for exist-
ing producers. Flexible production is both the cause of the inter-pen-
etration and contesting of markets as well as the· effect in the sense 
that it induces further market differentiation and narrower product 
market niches. The market differentiation has the important conse-
quence that producers are forced to expand into new geographical 
markets for these new differentiated products. They have to export in 
order to recoup the product development costs. Thus, if producers 
concentrate on a smaller segment of a value chain, they must expand 
geographically to maintain a similar level of output. This also con-
tributes to increase the intra-industry trade share of international trade 
(Dicken, 1998). 
Collective efficiency 
One of the issues that triggered the policy relevance of NID and per-
haps also the imagination of researchers and policy makers, is the 
notion of collective efficiency intrOduced. by Hubert Schmitz. 
(Schmitz, 1989, 1995b and 1999a). For him, agglomeration 
economies are less important. They are in a way 'old hat' and gener-
ally available to all firms in an agglomeration. More important is the 
fact that clustering permits firms to engage in different forms of joint 
action, which create additional advantages. Collective efficiency 
becomes a key feature of NIDs4. Special reference is made to inter-
firm vertical cooperation (with suppliers and with customers) and to 
different forms of horizontal cooperation. Rather than stressing the 
collective interest representation of small firms (see below), Schmitz 
and others lay the emphasis on self-help organisation. Clustering 
would give firms the opportunity to organise themselves better, estab-
lish business organisations, set up common services and establish 
common institutions (e.g. norms and standards). In other words, it 
would permit them to organise themselves and provide· critical ser-
vices, which would otherwise not be forthcoming. Firms are too small 
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to 'malee' these inputs themselves whiie, if dispersed, the market is 
too small for them to be able to 'buy' these inputs. Clustering solves 
this problem; that is joint action enables firms to generate collective 
services on a non-market basis. Externalities are generated by delib-
erate and purposeful joint action. 
The creation of common institutions that lower transformation and/or 
transaction costs, such as the sharing of equipment, technology infor-
mation centres, quality control, credit consortia, and common norms 
and standards for inputs and prQducts can only be realised if a certain 
geographical· concentration in the industry has emerged. It is impor-
tant to note that this generates advantages, but these advantages can-
not be easily seen as an initial cause of geographical concentration. 
Once geographical concentration has begun to organise itself as a 
cluster these untraded advantages may potentially be within reach. 
More recently a further distinction has been made between 'passive' 
and 'active' collective efficiency. Active collective efficiency denotes 
joint action aspects in both production and distribution. As competi-
tion gets more intense passive collective efficiency is not enough. 
Firms have 'to shift gear' and seek inter-firm cooperation as a means 
to become more competitive (Schmitz, 1999a). Joint action may vary 
in terms of the number of participating firms (bilateral or multilater-
al) and maybe oriented in a vertical or horizontal direction (Schmitz, 
1999a). In his most recent work Schmitz continued to stress the 
importance of joint action but has become more appreciative of local 
external economies (S'chmitz, 1999b). The latter may arise from con-
tinued private investment by firms in the cluster. The benefits spread 
through technological spillovers or seepage and the movement of 
trained workers to other firms. Contrary to neo-classical perceptions 
that such external effects would lead to under-investment, Schmitz 
argued that firms will continue to invest as they are not only providers 
of such external economies but also benefit from investments by other 
firms in the cluster. 
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Several authors have recently found that increased exposure to (new) 
competition induces firms to engage in more inter-firm cooperation 
(Rabelloti, 1999, Knorringa, 1999 and Schmitz, 1999). In most 
instances, this applies to vertical cooperation with suppliers and 
sometimes with contractors. Horizontal cooperation, required to 
increase efficiency at the meso-level, is less frequent. Catalysts are 
needed, as found in the ceramics industry studied by Meyer Stamer 
(1998). But potential catalysts do not always succeed in playing their 
role, as in the case of the state government in Rio Grande do SuI in 
relation to the shoe industry analysed by Schmitz (1999). It would 
seem appropriate to add that this inter-firm cooperation refers to more 
advanced clusters. 
Collective efficiency contributes to economic performance. Rabellotti 
and Schmitz (1999) and Schmitz (1999a) observed a positive associ-
ation between collective efficiency and economic performance of 
firms in clusters in Mexico, Brazil and Italy, using several perfor-
mance indicators. Elsewhere, Schmitz argued that clustering may be 
one of the factors contributing to increasing returns to scale and to 
competitive advantage for firms in clusters (Schmitz, 1999b). 
Another group of authors stressed collective efficiency through col-
lective action (Sengenberger and Pyke, 1991; Spath, 1991) as a basis 
for (small) firms to overcome their disadvantages and pay less atten-
tion to spatial clustering and agglomeration economies. The point of 
departure of this group of authors is small. enterprise development. 
The big problem for small firms is not 'being small' but 'being iso-
lated': 'as individual firms, acting on their own, they are in a poor 
position to compete. They lack the resources and the economies of 
scale and scope normally available to large companies and they lack 
the political voice necessary for influencing their economic and polit-
ical environment' (Sengenberger and Pyke, 1991:8). 'The main prob-
lem of smallfirms is their isolation and powerlessness, particularly in 
an environment aligned to large private and public enterprises' 
(Spath, 1991: 4). By joining efforts and pooling knowledge and 
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resources they can do better. Networking among small firms is cru-
cial. 
Sengenberger and Pyke distinguish between a 'high road' and 'low 
road' of industrial restructuring. The low road to restructuring is to 
meet stronger competition in markets by raising one's own competi-
tiveness through lowering labour costs and by a deregulated labour 
environment. This form of destructive competition can be very suc-
cessful. The alternative would be the 'high road' to restructuring, 
which is based on enhancing efficiency and innovation by better 
organisation, better mobilisation of resources and by safeguarding 
workers rights and wages. High labour standards would not only push 
firms to innovate but also malce innovation possible (Sengenberger 
and Pyke, 1991). They argue that collective action on the part of bus i-
ness associations and trade unions can induce industry to take the high 
road and prevent destructive competition into the low road. This 
brings in again governance issues to which we will return later (how 
to avoid the temptations of the low road). 
Differentiation within and between clusters 
By the mid-nineties, a fIrst stock taldng of the NID model, was con-
ducted by Humphrey (Humphrey, 1995). He noted three important 
problems. Firstly most definitions were restricted to small firms. This 
has obscured the role that large firms play in districts. The emphasis 
on inter-firm relations has diverted attention away from researching 
the internal structure and dynamics of firms. As has been argued by 
many, externalisation and subcontracting is but one response to 
. increased competition and uncertainty. Furthermore, entrepreneurial 
competence is assumed but cannot always be talcen for granted in 
small firms. The industrial district model focused heavily on inter-
firm relations within districts but failed to be specific on externallinlc-
ages. Schmitz added that differences in firm size might have implica-
tions for the characteristic socioeconomic features of industrial dis-
tricts, namely competition with cooperation, joint action, and embed-
dedness (Schmitz 1994). As argued earlier by Asheim, intra-district 
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firm dynamics may be altered when large firms emerge within clus-
ters or penetrate clusters from the outside. 
More recently, studies have come up with new evidence on differen-
tiation between and within clusters. A number of them were published 
in a second special issue of World Development, which appeared in 
September 1999. Taken together, these studies contribute several 
important findings. First of all, there seems to be a growing consen-
sus that there are many different types of clusters, not only in 
advanced countries (as elaborated by Markusen, 1996) but also in 
developing countries. New typologies of clusters are needed to deal 
with the fact that the alleged advantages of clustering and features of 
industrial districts are not always found. In reviewing African case 
studies, McCormick (1999) argued that there are at least three differ-
ent types, defined in terms of stages in the clustering-cum-industrial-
isation process. The first is the (pre-industrial) 'groundwork cluster' 
in which micro and small enterprises dominate, many of which are 
survival oriented. Conditions are highly competitive, there are no 
internal economies of scale, while the lack of inter-firm relations pre-
vents deepening of the division of labour. Cluster advantages are lim-
ited to mark~t access. The second is the 'industrialising cluster', 
which is still primarily local market oriented but which contains more 
advanced units. Also, this type enjoys limited external effects. The 
third category is the 'complex industrial cluster', which contains 
firms oriented towards national markets and to exports. This cluster 
comes closest to the theoretical ideal type. Case studies record joint 
action in this type of cluster, albeit ad-hoc and on a limited scale. 
Most African clusters enjoy only (limited) passive cluster advantages. 
This classification bears some resemblance to the one proposed by 
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999), based on the examination of 
Latin American clusters. They proposed a three-fold typology. The 
first, the 'survival cluster' of micro and small enterprises, roughly 
combined the first two specified by McCormick. The authors also 
considered cluster advantages to be limited and largely passive. Their 
second type refers to more advanced and differentiatedinass produc-
ers, which were typically established during the era of import substi-
tution. Their third type has no counterpart in the African classifica-
tion. It consists of clusters of TNCs. They draw on cases in Central 
America, especially Mexico, where NAFfA has triggered a re-orien-
tation of foreign investment and attracted new foreign investment in 
the form of core suppliers. The Gamarra cluster in Lima, Peru, stud-
ied by Visser would fall in the first category, with firms enjoying pri-
marily passive effects arising from local external economies (Visser, 
1996). Visser's recent contribution confirms this. Firms primarily 
enjoy passive collective efficiency advantages in the transaction 
sphere (Viss'er, 1999). In this context it is important to add that exter-
nal economies in the transaction sphere were found to have greater 
significance than those generated in the transformation sphere. The 
latter were absent or applicable to subgroups only5. 
A second important finding of the recent studies is the fact that there 
is frequently considerable differentiation between firms within a clus-
ter. Clusters are not homogenous in terms of firm characteristics, nor 
do they remain homogenous over time. Some firms benefit more from 
clustering than others. Agglomeration economies accrue, in principle, 
to all firms and hence are an unlikely cause of differentiation. The 
question therefore arises whether active collective efficiency helps to 
explain these differences. Studies by Rabelloti and Schmitz (1999) 
and Schmitz (1999a) demonstrate that there is a positive association 
between inter-firm cooperation as a component of active collective 
efficiency and the economic performance of firms in the researched 
,cluster. This applies especially to medium-sized firms. Rabelloti and 
Schmitz found that large firms draw less on the cluster while small 
firms engage less in joint action. Kriorringa, examining the footwear 
industry in Agra, India found market channels to be an important dif-
ferentiating factor within the cluster (Knorringa, 1999). 
2.3 Reflections 
The exchange and cross-fertilisation of ideas between Krugman and 
NID authors and economic geographers have generally been compli-
cated by differences in approach and by the manner in which the two 
have interacted6• There are important common features and comple-
mentarities between Krugman and the NID literature (cf. Martin and 
Sunley, 1996 and Boddy, 1999). Starting with the common features, 
both Krugman and NID stress the importance of clustering and draw 
on Marshall to identify the different types of externalities involved. 
The technological dynamism of clusters received little attention from 
Krugman and NID authors have only very recently begun to look into 
this (e.g. Asheim, 1996). Bell and Albu (1999) reviewed a number of 
NID studies and found these to lack ~ learning orientation. 
Furthermore, labour market externalities are identified by both, but 
the NID literature pays less attention to them. In fact, flexible spe-
cialisation was found to cause labour market segmentation. 
Krugman emphasised the path-dependent nature of regional speciali-
sation and pointed to the dangers of a lock-in when high levels of spe-
cialisation are reached? Initially, the advocates of flexible specialisa-
tion heralded NID as a challenge to large-scale 'fordist' production. 
Since the mid-nineties more realistic positions have been talcen. 
Clusters may be just a phase in industrial development. 
There are corriplementarities, for example, in so far as Krugman con-
nected clustering with increasing returns and with international trade. 
With regard to the former, only very recently, Schmitz (1999) has 
made an attempt to link collective efficiency with increasing returns. 
Certainly initially, the linlc between clusters and international trade 
received less attention in the NID literature. As observed by 
Humphrey (1995) the NID research was inward oriented, looking at 
what happened within the clusters, and ignoring their external nexus. 
There are also important differences. The NID literature has 
unearthed a greater variety of traded externalities, emphasising par-
ticular transaction advantages. The emphasis of NID literature has 
shifted over time, giving greater weight to un traded externalities, 
those arising from collective efficiency and from historical and social 
16 
embedding. Krugman ignored these for reasons of methodology. A 
closely related point is that for Krugman external economies are suf-
ficient. The NID literature attaches great importance to active collec-
tive efficiency: Joint action by firms and supporting public agencies 
and local governments. 'External economies cannot capture all effects 
of clustering because it refers only to unintended by-products of other 
firm's decisions' (Schmitz, 1999a). 
What may be an 'accident of history' in advanced countries, studied 
by Krugman, may be a heavily structured 'product of history' in many 
developing countries, especially those with a colonial past. This is 
what 'old' centre-periphery theorists have been pointing out for many 
years, in a widely varied palette of theoretical strands and orienta-
tions. In any case, their analyses of centre-periphery structures were 
more varied and complex than the factors identified by Krugman. 
Increasing returns and external economies confer to the constituent 
firms some specific local competitive advantages. However, 
Krugman is critical about the notion of competitiveness per se, as well 
as applied to countries or regions; the latter are not lilee corporations 
(Krugman, 1994). Others, in particular, new ~conomic geographers, 
have however raised the question whether strategic trade policy can 
be employed to create such local 'competitive advantages' (e.g. 
Martin and. Sunley, 1996). If clusters are proof of the working of 
external economies, then such clusters would help to define what 
industries should be supported. In this way the controversial trade 
policy issue. of targeting may be resolved. These authors conclude 
that: 'In effect what Krugman seems to be suggesting, though he does 
not use the term explicitly, is that the only justifiable form of indus-
trial (trade) policy is in fact regional industrial development policy' 
(Martin and Sunley, 1996: 282). Regional industrial policy would 
then have the potential to foster national competitive advantage. The 
latter had been already a broad contention formulated by Michael 
Porter (1985, 1990)8. 
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Last but not least there is a question which intrigued Krugman but 
which the NID literature generally took for granted. Why do clusters 
. arise in the first place? For Krugman there is a general tendency to 
concentrate production so as to gain economies of scale, and large 
firms co-locate because of the external economies. Circular cumula-
tive causation does the rest. The NID literature usually begins with 
small firm clusters. Less attention is given to the question why clus-
tering occurred, that is before flexible technology made it possible for 
small firms to gain additional passive external economies and even-
tually organise themselves to develop active collective efficiency 
advantages. There may be other unrelated causes. 
In this context it is interesting to reflect on the fact that Krugman 
builds on the work of Brian Arthur. In 1994 a collection of essays 
written by Arthur in the eighties appeared under the title of 
'Increasing returns and path dependence' (Arthur, 1994). Arthur 
developed three mathematical models of agglomeration. In the first 
agglomeration is driven by external economies and the location of 
firms is interdependent. The other two models do not require this. In 
one the locational requirements of industries are independent of each 
other. Arthur ~howed that this might give rise to either geographical 
dispersal or concentration, depending on the specification of these 
requirements. Thus, if all firms require certain inputs, like the shoe 
industry requiring leather, they may co-locate in the vicinity of 
leather-tanning firms. The third and last is the 'spin off' model, where 
the growth of an industry and the generation of new firms is depen-
dent upon the prior existence of firms in the same sector (entrepre-
neurial seedbed function). Irrespective of the initial (uneven) distrib-
ution, this model eventually leads to concentration. 
In many developing countries markets are small, and the division of 
labour has not advanced very far. SMEs predominate alongside a few 
privileged large firms. For the small firms the 'spin-off' model may 
be more applicable. Geographical concentration may be anexpression 
of lack of access· to markets and of the peripheral positions of these 
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finns within the local economy. The key question is whether a geo-
graphical concentration, once it exists, can turn itself into an organ-
ised industrial district. This brings us to dynamic issues, which the 
early body of NID literature has largely ignored. 
3. Learning and innovation 
3.1 Introduction 
In the early 1980s Nelson and Winter formulated their evolutionary 
perspective on economic change. One of their central propositions is 
that firm behaviour can be explained by the routines they employ. 
Knowledge, of these routines is the heart of understanding that behav-
iour (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 128). The more a routine involves 
tacit knowledge the more dIfficult it is to imitate it, let alone from a 
distance (ibid: 124). Firms will try to codify their routines, so as to 
reduce the problems of replication. Codification detaches knowledge 
from its immediate local context, and malces it widely available. 
However there are limits to the degree to which such codification can 
take place. 
Routines are changed when a problem occurs. That is when standard 
responses no longer work. But finns have limited search capabilities 
and are subject to bounded rationality. The implied learning may lead 
to incremental innovation as moving in small steps contains uncer-
tainty. Furthermore, successful innovation draws on other existing 
and well-tested subroutines, further enhancing the incremental char-
acter. Learning processes are cumulative. Routines and learning intro-
duce path dependence. 'The routines of today are based on those of 
yesterday, as much as those of tomorrow are related to those of today' 
(ibid). 
This new evolutionary thinking gained influence in local and region-
al studies in the late eighties and early nineties. A number of new 
ideas were built up which together constitute an emerging new per-
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spective on local economic development. Central to this build up 
were two issues. One was based on the proposition that tacit knowl-
edge exchange needs spatial (as well as organisational or cultural) 
proximity. The second referred to the territorial context of processes 
of learning and lmowledge creation. Collective learning became a 
new guiding concept. Emphases and analytical entry points varied. 
Some started from the perspective of firms, others drew on emerging 
literature on the national innovation system and gave this notion ter-
ritorial hands and feet; Yet others developed the notion of 'learning 
region' and 'innovative milieu'. In the following .subsections we will 
paint these theoretical developments in broad strokes as major fea-
tures of a new emerging perspective on local economic development. 
3.2 Learning and collective learning 
In the competence theory of the fIrm, a fIrm is defIned as a reposito-
ry of productive knowledge (rather than a nexus of contracts). 
Learning by doing is central to maintaining and renewing competen-
cies. 'Core competencies are the collective learning in the organisa-
tion, especially how to coordinate diverse production sldlls and inte-
grate mUltiple technologies... Core competencies do not diminish 
with use but .are enhanced by it' (Lawson, 1999). In this view, prod-
uct market competition is merely a superficial expression of a deeper 
competition over competencies. Conceiving the firm as core compe-
tencies suggests that inter-firm competition, as opposed to inter-prod-
uct competition is essentially concerned with the acquisition of 
lmowledge and sldlls (ibid). 
Given rapid economic and technological change, firms need to devel-
op a dynamic capability to renew, augment or adapt their competen-
cies in order to maintain economic performance. Innovation and 
learning are central and involve combining diverse technological, 
organisational and market lmowledge. Lawson and Lorenz (1999) 
elaborate on three central ideas from organisational learning. Firstly, 
that learning depends on the sharing of knowledge 'and that this 
lmowledge is mostly tacit and embodied in organisational routines 
20 
and procedures. The second idea is that new knowledge depends on 
combining diverse lmowledge. The third idea is organisational ineltia" 
Firms may find it difficult to malce effective use of new lmowledge 
because they face resistance to changes in their existing routines and 
procedures in which lmowledge is embodied. When diverse lmowl-
edge gets recombined the associated tacit knowledge must be made 
precise and discursive. This provides a basis for the redesign of rou-
tines, which in turn creates the new tacit lmowledge needed to work 
under the new conditions. 
Firms have a limited capacity to undertake a range of activities. 
Choices must be made. Complementary activities requiring' similar 
lmowledge may be best coordinated within the firm, while activities 
based on non-similar knowledge call for coordination through formal 
or informal cooperation between firms. Thus, when firms want to 
invest in new products or processes, as they may be forced to follow-
ing heightened and 'new' competition after market liberalisation, they 
encounter problems because they lack the knowledge to efficiently 
undertalce the complementary activities needed to produce and mar-
ket them. Inter-firm cooperation becomes a key to address this issue. 
The authors therefore conclude that in regions where this comple-
mentary knowledge is available, firms have a better chance to learn 
and develqp new routines and competences. Slalled labour, specialist 
services arid inter-firm cooperation create a capability in a region or 
cluster to renew 'and augment the competences of firms. This requires 
a social context, and a common language and culture to facilitate 
, exchange, and the region may provide these. 
Camagni (1991) adopted a somewhat different approach. He argued 
that uncertainty lies at the heart of the problem. Firms employ dif-
ferent functions to cope with uncertainty. The local economic envi-
ronment and networks can enhance the capacity of firms to do this. 
Camagni identified different gaps and ways in which firms develop 
functions, routines and procedures to address these. They suffer from 
an information gap, as information is imperfect and costly to collect. 
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There is an assessment gap linked to the hidden characteristics of 
inputs, components, production factors and equipment (the 'lemon' 
problem). There is a competence gap linked to the limited ability of 
the firm to process and understand information. In addition to these 
static sources of uncertainty, there are two dynamic sources, namely, 
uncertainty arising from imperfect foresight in assessing the out-
comes of alternative actions and lastly, there is uncertainty arising 
from the control gap. That is to say the outcome of actions depends 
on the independent decisions of other actors over which the firm has 
little or no controL The firm develops functions, routines and proce-
dures to cope with these different sources of uncertainty. It engages in 
search routines to collect data in particular formats. I engages in tech-
nological monitoring etc. It adopts screening and signalling functions 
to respond to market signals and for inspection of the characteristics 
of inputs and the certification of outputs. It adopts a trans-coding 
function by which it translates chaotic and unordered information into 
a language that the firm can understand (firm-specific knowledge). 
The decision-control gap is addressed by adopting firm-specific deci-
sion routines and management styles. Lastly, large firms may reduce 
the complexity of the external enviroru:llent by engaging equity par-
ticipation, acquisition and mergers. These are all measures internal to 
the firm. There are however two new ways by which firms can 
enhance their capacity to cope with uncertainty. One is through the 
local economic environment and the other is via inter-fIrm networks. 
The local environment can complement the above-mentioned func-
tions for the firm in a number of ways (Camagni, 1991). It becomes a 
milieu9• It can engage in the collective gathering and screening of 
information through informal exchanges between firms operating in 
the same markets and by public or the cooperative monitoring of mar-
kets and technical change. The milieu can perform a signalling func-
tion about the direction of the markets of local fIrms, in terms of prod-
uct image, reputation, cooperative advertising and quality certifica-
tion. It provides a collective learning process involving different 
channels: i) the mobility of skilled labour within the local labour mar-
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ket; ii) technical and organisational interaction between suppliers and 
customers; iii) imitation and reverse engineering of successful appli-
cations of general purpose technologies; iv) informal knowledge 
exchange via 'cafeteria effects'; and v) complementary information 
and specialist services. Firms in the milieu can informally exchange 
decision routines and aspects of management styles through manage-
rial labour mobility, and they can imitate decisions and/or engage in 
cooperative decision-making via business associations. The milieu 
can contribute to reducing the control gap by local decision coordina-
tion through interpersonal linkages (families, clans, business clubs 
and associations), better and faster circulation of relevant informa-
tion, and better financial-industrial linkage. Last but not least, the 
local milieu facilitates the external nexus. This is especially important 
in terms of articulating the needs of the firms in the labour market, 
human capital formation and education. 
In conclusion, the milieu reduces uncertainty by raising transparency, 
constrains opportunistic behaviour, gathers, organises and exchanges 
information, provides additional signalling and articulates the needs 
of firms. Learning takes place via supply chain linkages (supplier and 
customer relations), labour mobility and, last but not least, spin-off 
activity (Camagni, 1991, Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). 
Proximity is central to the effectiveness of the milieu. Camagni gives 
several arguments for this. First of all, human capital resources are 
often highly mobile within the local area but quasi immobile with 
-respect to other areas. Specialisation and geographical concentration 
provide a dense local labour market but offer few opportunities out-
side the area. Secondly, the interaction generates an intricate network 
of mainly informal contacts among local actors, creating an 'industri-
al atmosphere'. Synergy effects stem from a common cultural, psy-: 
chological and often political background (Camagni, 1991:133/4). 
The milieu is one mechanism of learning and of reduction of uncer-
tainty. The network is another. It may be defined as 'a close set of 
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selected and explicit linkages with preferential partners in a firm's 
space of complementary assets and market relationships, having as a 
major goal the reduction of static and dynamic uncertainty' (Camagni, 
1991:135). Thus, instead of exploiting local synergies and collective 
learning mechanisms, a firm engages in selective networking on a 
trans-regional or even trans-national basis. They engage in joint ven-
tures, strategic alliances, consortia, technical cooperation, licensing 
and franchising arrangements and cross-commercialisation. In these 
ways firms obtain access to important complementary assets, markets 
and technologies without having to incur organisational or locational 
costs, and they also free themselves from the limits of localised (and 
internal) competence. 
Which of these two new operators is adopted, milieu or network 
depends, among other factors, on the initial conditions in the area, 
firm size and structure, the degree of competition and cooperation, 
local industry dynamics and differentiation. ill general, one could 
argue that patterns of learning are different for small firms than for 
large ones. Large fIrms are more autonomous, can mobilise internal 
resources, have their RandD budgets, can engage in strategic alliances 
etc. Small fin;ns lack the resources to maintain a dynamic capability 
on their own and need to draw on external resources and support. This 
need not necessarily be public resources but can especially take for 
form of relations with other firms, large and small. Hence, for small 
firms the local milieu is an important mechanism for learning. The 
milieu is open-ended and relies on 'pure' externalities, while net-
works are selective and closed and turn externalities into club goods. 
From here the relative strengths and weaknesses of these two new 
operators can be inferred. The milieu, involving larger numbers of 
participants, is relatively stronger in dealing with monitoring, assess-
ment and transcoding of information, while networks, more selec-
tively composed, are more effective in relation to decision and control 
gaps. 
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To summarise, the prysence of local collective learning enhances the 
capacity of local firms to learn to adapt and to innovate. In compari- I 
son to other fIrms, they can tap a larger resource base and draw on I 
additional local processes to renew and augment their competences. r 
The local milieu offers a local capability for sustained competitive 
advantage. Foss (quoted by Maskell and Malmberg, 1999) argued that 
there are two requisites for this to 'happen. Firstly, that the local capa-
bility cannot simply be purchased and transferred elsewhere (it would 
have to be regionally specific) and, secoJ;ldly, that it cannot easily be 
replicated elsewhere (imperfect imitation). Capabilities rooted in a 
person or in a firm may be easily bought, but capabilities residing in 
inter-personal connections and in localised inter-firm networking can-
not. With regard to the question of replication, Maskell and Malmberg 
argued that the creation of regional or local capability entails tacit 
knowledge that goes with any (codified) knowledge creation. This 
tacit knowledge prevents perfect replication, in spite of the potential-
ly global distribution of the relevant codified knowledge. 
Local regional competence for collective learning 
Lorenz goes one step further. He argued that if firm-level learning 
takes place to overcome coordination problems, then 'regional col-
lective learning can be understood as the emergence of basic common 
knowledge and procedures across a set of geographically proximate 
firms which facilitates cooperation and the solution of common prob-
lems' (Lorenz, 1999:320). Central factors are: i) a common language 
for talking about technological and organisational problems; ii) 
shared or partially overlapping technological/engineering knowledge; 
and iii) shared organisational lmowledge on how to manage and 
divide responsibilities and modalities of collective decision-making. 
Preconditions for collective learning are common, regional, cultural-
ly based rules of behaviour, a language of engagement and collabora-
tion, and accepted but tacit codes of conduct between firms, which 
enable the development of trust, itself essential for innovative collab-
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oration. Often a local 'collective agent' of some land plays a pivotal 
role in enhancing these preconditions. 
In Lawson's term the milieu acquires its own competences. These are 
understood here as emergent properties of social activity. 'Some level 
of organisation can be said to be emergent if there is a sense in which 
it has arisen out of some lower level but is not reducible to it or pre-
dictable from it' (Lawson, 199:157). Regional competencies arise out 
of the interaction between individuals and organisations. Processes of 
labour mobility between organisations, birth and death rates of firms 
(via spin-offs or vertical disintegration of firms) fall outside the 
purview of firm-level competencies but become central to the analy-
sis of regional competencies. They all have spatial proximity in com-
mon. 'Tiling all these factors together, the region, as a productive 
system, may be differentiated as an ensemble of competences that 
stretches both through space and across organisations, and contains a 
degree of coherence in virtue of the nature of (localised) interaction 
constitutive of it' (Lawson, 1999:157) 
3.3 Innovative milieu 
The innovative milieu has its analytical roots in the early eighties 
especially in the French School, which sought to describe the trans-
formation of the spatial structure in France, where old industrial 
regions were declining in the north while new regional economies 
were rising in the south. Peripheral regions acquired their own 
dynamics, leading to territorially integrated forms of production , 
organisation. The processes of collective learning were expected to be 
behind this and involved not only firms, but also other actors, such as 
universities, local authorities and intermediary and support organisa-
tions. ' .. .in certain regions there are innovative milieus - that is, sets 
oflocal players who, on the basis of similar or complementary know-
how, have developed Ii cOhvergent perception of the requirements and 
opportunities that have arisen in their technological and market envi-
ronment, and have developed jointly and interdependently the rules of 
competition/cooperation that accompany them' (Maillat, 1995:158) 
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Milieus were seen as social incubators' of innovation with the compe-
tence to implement and to bring them to fruition. The conceptual 
development draws on the GREMI group of researchers of whom 
Camagni is one of the leading exponents. 'The milieu is a collective 
operator which reduces the static and dynamic degree of uncertainty 
facing firms by tacitly and explicitly organising functional interde-
pendency of IQcal players and by informally performing the functions 
of search, transmission, selection, transcoding, transformation and 
control of information' (Maillat, 1995: 160). The milieu represents the 
role of a production system, which itself is more than the sum of net-
worked firms, a technical culture and other players. The milieu is a 
product of two logics. One is the functional logic of industrial'organ-
isation (e.g. as corporate strategies) and the other is the organic inte-
gration of the territorial production system as a whole. The innovative 
milieu generates the processes by which these two logics meet. 
A milieu must, according to Maillat, have certain properties. There 
must be a collection of players consisting of firms, research and train-
ing institutes, and local authorities, which must have relative deci-
sion-making independence and relative autonomy in making strategic 
choices. There must be an interaction logic that derives from cooper-
ation: players must be interdependent in order to take greater advan-
tage of existing resources. There must be a learning dynamic, that is 
manifested"by the players' ability, formed over time, to modify their 
own behaviour and to implement new solutions to achieve changes in 
their environment. 
A milieu becomes innovative when local actors begin to exploit 
advantages of collective learning and to adjust their own actions to 
that end. Thus, when 'interactions amongst economic agents develop 
as they learn about multilateral transactions that generate innovation 
specific externalities, and as the leatning processes converge towards 
increasingly efficient forms of joint management of resources' 
(Maillat, 1995:161). A milieu becomes innovative when it has, 
become capable of organising its resources and coordinating and link-
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ing economic, cultural and technological structures, thus creating new 
ways of productively combining these resources. Innovative capabil-
ity depends not only on new combinations of existing resources but 
also on linking up with external resources. In other words, the milieu 
must develop the higher order competence to open up to the rest of 
the world and mobilise external resources. 
3.4 Evolutionary trajectories of local economic development? 
Researchers have been preoccupied with the question of the long-
term sustainability of NIDs. Cluster may decline, from within, as a 
result of internal differentiation processes, as some firms are likely to 
be more successful in capturing the gains of NID than others; internal 
and/or external acquisitions and mergers, under the impact of height-
ened competition, can cause further internal differentiation. What are 
the dynamics of industrial districts, what trajectories are possible? 
There is general agreement that one of the major changes affecting 
clusters is the increasing international competition as countries open 
up their economies. What is the capacity of a cluster to respond to 
external changes and what is the role of external agents? Humphrey 
(1995) suggested in that context using the notion of global commod-
ity chains. Gl<?bal chains organise global markets and a distinction 
may be made between producer driven and buyer driven chains. The 
former coordinated by large manufacturing firms, while the latter are 
coordinated by large retailers and trading companies. The global 
chains consist essentially of sets of networks, some of which may be 
extended into existing industrial districts. 'The trajectory of develop-
ment of the cluster will be the outcome of an interaction between the 
firms and institutions in the cluster and the other elements in the com-
modity chain. Whether or not insertions into a commodity chain will 
create development potential for a cluster will depend on both its 
position in the chain and the capacity of firms and institutions to malce 
use of or create sources of competitive advantage and opportunities 
for upgrading' (Humphrey, 1995:158). The land of integration varies 
by type of chain, and according to the demand characteristics of the 
products. The sustainability of a NID depends on the external nexus 
, 
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and oyd implications at the level of the industrial organisation of the 
cluster. 
Others considered the endogenous technological capability of NIDs 
essential. If technological change and innovation are the driving 
forces of competition, how do SMEs acquire such capability? Authors 
such as Ash~im, (1996) and Capello, (1999) and others draw on col-
lective learning as the key to SME endogenous innovative capacity. 
According to Asheim (1996) the early version of NID emphasised the 
traditional Marshallian features. That is to say, by clustering small 
firms compensate for their lack cif internal economies of scale. By 
specialisation and deepening the division of labour, each firm repli-
cates specialised activities integrated within the organisation of a dis-
trict, gaining external economies of scale. This is, in Asheim's view, 
a rather fordist conception and too much centred on static locational 
efficiency. Such a system would be able to generate incremental tech-
nical change along the existing technological trajectory (benefiting 
from economies of scope). However, once such extended division of 
labour has been achieved there is the real danger of 'lock-in', where 
firms would lack the required flexibility for more radical change and 
be unable to change course. Furthermore, once locked-in, the district 
as a whole may find wage competition more convenient and a less 
risky option. to maintain competitiveness. This would mean that the 
NID would fall back into the 'low road of industrialisation' . 
To prevent itself from falling into that trap, a NID would have to 
increase its technological capability and transform into a 'learning 
region'. Collective learning would'he the answer for small firms. In 
addition to learning-by-doing and learning-by-using, collective learn-
ing would enhance learning-by-interaction. In essence, this would 
require the transformation of an NID along three axes. First of all, 
organisational changes within firms. Theories of learning and innova-
tion, as well as the theory of new competition (Best, 1990), stress 
internal.changes to a flat type of organisation, with new styles of man-
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agement and management concerns (including TQM), new forms of 
work organisation and human resources management. Inter-firm rela-
tions constitute the second axis. Porter (1990), Best (1990) and others 
have pointed to the development of inter-fIrm relations as the core 
organisational change constituting a driving force towards innovation 
and competitiveness. Not all types of inter-firm relations are con-
ducive to learning. Horizontal (user-producer and producer-client) 
relations are more conducive to learning than vertical subcontracting 
(Asheim, 1996). If the intensity of horizontal interaction in a district 
grows, learning by interaction may emerge. Once such a process is set 
in motion, the quality of the relationships can develop further, based 
on accumulated trust, sharing information etc. Relational contracting 
may emerge, as both parties invest further in their relationships. The 
third axis, according to Asheim (1996) are the relationships between 
the fIrms and the local regional economy and society. Here the author 
refers primarily to the interaction between firms, universities and 
training centres and local public institutionsJO• 
A more expanded analysis comes from Capello (1999). She starts 
from a distinction between firm-level learning and collective learning. 
Within the firm the continuity of learning is assured by the R&D 
function. At the level of the territory, low labour mobility outside the 
milieu and stable linkages with suppliers and customers assure conti-
nuity of collective learning. Dynamic synergies are generated by 
functional interaction within the firm and through tacit lmowledge 
transfer, Dynamic synergies are generated when there is a high 
turnover of workers between firms within the milieu, ~s well as by 
innovative cooperation in the production column and through local 
spin-offs. For small firms this collective learning is essential. They 
gain from it, but also contribute to it. There is information and know-
ledge seepage (via informal channels and labour mobility) as well as 
consciously pursued exchange via supplier,..user/client interaction. 
'Knowledge gets socialised independent of the original will or inten-
tion of the inventor (oo.) Interactive linkages are the reasons for their 
long term permanence and strategic importance. They help define the 
technological trajectory of the milieu by setting in motion a positive 
circular relationship between the identification of needs and the gen-
eration of new stimuli and ideas for the satisfaction of those needs 
which feed both process and product innovation' (ibid: 356). 
In her view collective learning is not the result of the conscious co-
operative behaviour of local agents. There may be a lot of imitation, 
reverse engineering, technological upgrading of products and 
processes as well as radical innovation that occur independently of 
the will of the original creator. What may be consciously pursued are 
individual strategies of agents to deliberately exploit 'innovations in 
the air'. Collective learning is more like a club good. By contributing 
to it, one gets access to all benefits, and it is up to individual firms to 
exploit this. 
According to Capello one may distinguish certain preconditions that 
define the transition from one form of local development situation to 
another. A geographical concentration, which may have emerged for 
whatever reason, may become a specialised area or a cluster if stable 
SME linkages emerge and once a stable local labour market has 
developed. If these conditions are not satisfied, the area is likely to 
remain diversified and lacking specialisation. A specialised area may 
develop into a district when organisational and cultural proximity 
emerges. Such proximity and mutual acceptance of certain norms of 
reciprocity and respect contain opportunism and moral hazard and 
contribute to the reduction of transaction costs. Cooperation may 
emerge alongside competition. Deepening of the division of labour 
generates further economies of scale and scope leading to further inte-
gration. A ·full Marshallian district can grow. Such a district may 
develop into a milieu if innovative synergies emerge between local 
firms and through the labour force. Collective learning begins to 
enhance the innovative capacity of the area. Once local actors realise 
the potential of collective learning and begin to exploit its advantages, 
as demonstrated by organisational innovations at the level of firm, 
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network and level of governance, then one has reached the stage of an 
innovative milieu. 
3.5 Specialisation, localised learning and global markets 
Maskell et al. (1998) and Maskell and Malmberg (1999) frame their 
thought provoldng contribution in a local-global context. What is the 
role, if any, of local capability ina world that is globalising? Their 
central contention is that 'knowledge creation of even the most glob-
ally oriented fIrm or sector is, at least to some extent, influenced by 
differences in the economic properties of their place of location. 
Firms are progressively stimulated by and dependent on localised 
capabilities in order to maintain and increase their competitiveness 
preCisely because of the drive towards globalisation and the resulting 
homogenisation of formerly critical factors of production' (Maskell 
and Malmberg, 1999: 168). 
Maskell and Malmberg adopt an evolutionary perspective. They use 
the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge and the assoCia-
tion between the two. Tacit knowledge requires cultural and spatial 
proximity; and sharing the same values, background and understand- . 
ing of implied technical and commerCial problems. They argue that 
the character of knowledge creation and transfer is changing as a 
result of globalisation. Globalisation allows codified knowledge to be 
more easily accessed anywhere across the globe. In effect, previously 
localised capabilities and local production factors are becoming ubiq-
uitous. Such Ubiquitous factors cannot be the basis of local capabili-
ties because of the likelihood of someone else obtaining them at a 
lower cost. In effect, the libiquitification of lmowledge, together with 
the internationalisation of factor and inputs markets; destroys local 
capabilities. 
l\ccording to Maskell and Malmberg, one must look therefore for 
.other explanations as to why patterns of speCialisation of industries 
continue to be stable in many countries. In their view, the locally 
embedded taCit knowledge becomes a crucial source of localised 
capability. These tacit knowledge differences between localities, 
regions and countries cannot easily be washed away by globalising 
markets. 'Both the formation of the world market and the process of 
codification· increases the importance of heterogenous, localised 
capabilities for building firm-specific competences and thus for vari-
ations between firms in competitiveness' (Ibid: 172). In a lmowledge-
based economy localised capabilities increase the 'ability of firms to 
create, acquire, accumulate and utilise knowledge a little faster than 
their cost-wise more favourable competitors' (Maskell et al, 1998:51). 
Localised capabilities are developed from four sources: i) infrastruc-
ture and built environment; ii) natural resources of the area; 'iii) spe-
cific institutional endowments; and iv) lmowledge and skills available 
in the area. All four are moulded by history. 
Maskell and Malmberg single out institutional endowments and 
knowledge and skills as the crucial factors. Institutional endowments 
are defined in an all-embracing manner. They 'embrace all the rules, 
practices, routines, habits, tradition, custom and conventions associ-
ated with the regional supply of capital, land and labour and the 
regional markets for goods and services. It also includes the entrepre-
neurial spirit, moral beliefs, political traditions and decision making 
practices, culture, religion and other basic features' (Maskell .and 
Malmberg, 1999: 173). Institutional endowments, thus defined, are a 
product of history, of previous rounds of economic activity, and set 
the stage for new rounds of localised knowledge creation. In a strong 
evolutionary argument, they state. 'The regional institutional endow-
ment might be created, ·transformed, eroded and recreated through the 
economic history of the region,' but at each point in time it has a direc-
tional effect on the efforts of firms [and other local actors] in the 
region by supporting and assisting some types of knowledge creation 
while hampering and preventing others'. 'The instihltional endow-
ment simultaneously spurs and confines the development of firms in 
the region, thereby exerting a strong - but not deterministic - influ-
ence on the future of the region' (Ibid: 174). G~ SOC4{
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How are these localised capabilities created? One important mecha-
nism is the 'first mover advantage'. The original location may be 
accidental (or not) but once in place the specialised demands from the 
firm will influence the future development of the localised capabili-
ties, malting it advantageous for the industry to remain in the area, and 
for outlying firms to relocate' (Maskell et al, 1998: 57). The emerging 
pattern of industry agglomeration and regional specialisation must be 
seen as the result of the evolutionary process of selection: areas that 
have suitable local capabilities can better serve the needs of firms and 
thereby give them a better chance of survival. As the industry grows, 
more institutional development to suit these firms, for example in the 
areas of hard and soft infrastructure, training of the workforce etc, 
augments the competitive advantage of the area. A further mechanism 
is that new fIrms will reproduce and reinforce the existing industry 
profile. Local entrepreneurs will move into this industry because dur-
ing their lifetime they gain industry-specific knowledge and experi-
ence, and establish contacts with other fIrms and with local institu-
tions that are important for the survival of their new firms. New firm 
formation and relocation of existing firms into the area enhance path 
dependency and positive feedback loops, for example, through the 
existence of local suppliers, services and the attraction of buyers. A 
third mechanism is triggered by positive feedback loops arising from 
internal economies of scale and from agglomeration economies. 
Maskell et al. stress the importance of knowledge spillovers for 
localised learning. Other positive feedback comes from transaction 
cost adVantages. They refer to governance and higher level regional 
competence, when they argue that goal congruence within a cluster 
can be achieved through: i) family and quasi-family ties between 
firms; ii) common or industrial group ownership; iii) interlocldng 
directorships; and iv) partial equity stalces and/or national/regional 
patriotism 
Ideally, localised capabilities must be valuable, rare, not easily sub-
stituted and imperfectly imitated. Three mechanisms contribute to 
this". The first is what Malmberg and Maskell call 'asset mass effi-
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ciency'. 'Regions that have a large stock of R&D and experienced-
based lmowledge, and a specialised labour force or infrastructure are 
often in a better position to make further breakthroughs which add to 
their existing stock of lmowledge than regions which have a limited 
initial endowment of such factors' (Malmberg and Maskell, 1999: 
176). A second mechanism is 'time compression diseconomy'. This 
basically implies that it takes considerable time to imitate institution-
al innovations and malce them work, which discourages attempts to 
copy. Thirdly, local learning is characterised by inter-connectedness 
of asset stocks. That is to say, it involves a complex web of links 
across national, regional and local institutions as well as between 
institutions at each level. Thus, being able to reproduce one' subset 
will turn out to be inadequate, as one will soon discover that other 
conditions need to be fulfilled as wellll • 
Localised capabilities do not confer permanent advantage. 'Regions 
(must) rebuild obsolete structures, renew exhausted resources, restore 
decrepit institutions, revitalise outdated slalls and replace inadequate 
lmowledge' (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999: 178). Deterioration may 
result .from reduced demand for the products of the industry. 
Ubiquitification of industry lmowledge and of production factors and 
imitation elsewhere may erode local advantages. Asset erosion may 
also be endogenous when there is a lack of new rounds of investment, 
ageing and a gradual redundancy of slalls, bureaucratisation of insti-
tutions (which lose their sense of mission), and the brealang up of 
(knowledge creating) public-private partnerships under the impact of 
privatisation. Capabilities may deteriorate due to substitution (e.g. IT) 
or lock-in. This occurs when previously successful institutions and 
firms resist change. As Olson argued many years ago, distributional 
coalitions of interest groups may appropriate gains and oppose 
change. Local elite, managers, trade unions and politicians may form 
alliances that prevent structural change in declining industries. 
In contrast to popular opinion Maskell et. al. conclude that 'ongoing 
internationalisation might lead to more embeddedness and to depen-
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dence on specific institutions at local regional and national level 
rather than malce all industries footloose' (Maskell, ibid). 
3.6 Collective learning in the South 
In comparison to clusters and districts, there are very few studies on 
localised learning and innovation in lower and middle-income coun-
tries. Hence it may be too early to judge the degree to which this per-
spective can assist in understanding local economic development. At 
fIrst sight and perhaps subject to gross oversimplification, conditions 
in many of these countries do not seem very cpnducive. The industri-
al structure in many countries is characterised by a low degree of divi-
sion of labour, with relatively few firms in individual market seg-
ments. Often a few large firms dominate. At the same time there is no 
middle segment and a large number of undifferentiated small produc-
ers, often concentrated in 'pre-industrial' clusters. Problems of trust 
and fragmented markets further complicate the emergence of inter-
firm relations and subsequent learning. 
Import-substitution processes pre-empted the need for learning as 
technology was adopted 'lock, stock and barrel' from advanced coun-
tries and markets were heavily protected, reducing the need and 
incentive to improve products to suit local demand (Helmsing, 1993). 
Firms were vertically integrated, incorporating the manufacture of 
some inputs and internalising key producer services, and importing 
the remainder. Few were concerned about marketing, and many expe-
rienced 'seller's markets'. Few firms were 'world class' or regional 
market l'eaders. Most were imitators in a technological sense and 
national innovation systems were wealc. Low incomes meant that the 
role of 'demanding customers' was limited anyway. Moreover, rela-
tively affluent local people imitated western lifestyles, thereby 
enhancing the fIrst mover advantage of firms from the West. 
After structural adjustment had liberalised international trade and 
domestic markets, firms in these countries became exposed to inter-
national and 'new' competition. In many countries structural adjust-
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ment had enhanced (or at least not diminished) the turbulence of the 
macroeconomic conditions. In these circumstances of heightened 
uncertainty, vertical disintegration became a very rislcy strategy. 
Meyer-Stamer (1998) studied firm-level strategies in the textile, engi-
neering and ceramics industries in one. state in Brazil. He found that 
firms initially persisted in vertical integration. Even though ineffi-
cient, it insulated them from the turbulent economic environment. 
Vertical disintegration would have made firms dependent on many 
other suppliers of inputs and service providers. As competing imports 
began to bite, many firms began to lose their market share. Only in 
the ceramics industry did a process of collective learning begin thanlcs 
to the role of the local business association (Meyer-Stamer, 1998). 
My own research in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, also demonstrated that 
many firms resorted to strategies of 'belt tightening', 'economising' 
and 'accepting lower profit margins', rather than engaging in more 
innovative strategies (Helmsing, 1998a). The periodic economic 
crises, caused by recurrent droughts, had turned defensive strategies 
into accepted and effective routines, at least for as long as a drought 
would last. After liberalisation, more innovative strategies were 
required. The local situation in Bulawayo is still far removed from the 
conditions of an 'innovative milieu' (ibid). 
The problem for countries in the South is how to prevent a 'lock-in' 
into a role as low-wage producer, based on production platforms for 
TNCs. Upgrading is a necessity in order to generate higher wage 
employment. At the same time there is always the possibility that 
another country, in a 'race to the bottom', will offer even lower 
wages. The problems of upgrading remain real. 
The notion of collective learning offers exiting new avenues for the-
ory and policy but we need to know more about preconditions in 
developing countries. Few areas will meet the conditions necessary 
for an innovative milieu. Due to historical industrialisation paths, 
most industry is concentrated in capital cities and sometimes, other 
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larger cities. In these places the physical infrastructure is relatively 
better, there are universities, training institutes and specialised pro-
ducer services, and there is a relative concentration of firms. At the 
same time, many experiments are going on, some with good and oth-
ers with mixed results. For example, Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) 
related the case of Sercotec in Chile, which supported 'proyectos de 
fomento' of groups of enterprises. Schmitz (1999b) related the case of 
the footwear cluster in Brazil, where internal differentiation was 
already advanced. Some larger firms succeeded in linldng up with 
North American markets (or rather they were 'handpicked' by USA 
trading agents). Because they supplied large retail chains, they were 
not interested in putting their contracts at risk for a new collective 
learning experiment in design in which many other and smaller firms 
would also participate. Several NGOs in Latin America engaged in 
promoting economic activities organise 'bolsas de subcontratacion' 
(subcontracting fairs) where small producers can demonstrate their 
products and bid for contracts. They receive technical advice on how 
to improve their products. In Colombia, the government supported the 
creation of Competitiveness Boards, set up by business associations 
and local intermediary organisations' (including training institutions) 
and local and departmental governments to promote technical and 
organisational innovations. While processes of collective learning 
may present an important avenue for the upgrading of local produc-
ers, we know as yet too little about collective learning processes in 
local contexts of countries in the South, or about their effectiveness . 
. 4. Governance 
4.1 Introduction 
Economies are rapidly increasing in complexity. Firms not only 
depend on their own capacity to cope with this complexity, but draw 
on other firms and support institutions as providers of inputs and ser-
vices and as sources of learning and innovation. Problems of coordi-
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nation have multiplied, while uncertainties about outcomes have 
increased. In order to reduce or to cope with these and associated 
problems (such as information asymmetries, moral hazard and oppor-
tunism), governance becomes a critical issue. This general argument 
can also be extended to the local level. Scott and Storper (1992) for-
mulated it as follows: 'Regions in which (such) coordination is weak-
ly developed and in which unregulated competition prevails, face 
many problems and predicaments that compromise long-run viability. 
These regions are all the more vulnerable because, in a world of con-
tested markets, they find themselves faced with competitors based in 
regions that provide effective regulatory and coordinating services' 
(Scott and Storper, 1992:22). In other words, the viability or strength 
of a regional production system depends as much on the firms as on 
the local regulatory, coordinating and supporting institutions and the' 
way in which they interact. Systems that are better able to handle 
these problems, have a greater capacity for timely adaptation and this 
allows them to maintain a growth trajectory. New forms of gover-
nance are required, both industrial and territorial. 
The field of industrial governance has undergone rapid changes. New 
core concepts are networks (Thompson, 1991, Hakanson, 1989), 
commodity chains (Dicken, 1998), production systems (Storper and 
Scott, 1992), clusters (porter, 1990, Schmitz, 1989) and business sys-
tems (Whitley, 1992). Relations between firms have been conceptu-
alised in a great variety of ways. 
One can distinguish different logics and scales. On the one hand, sec-
tor level organisation, consisting of producers' lobby groups, provide 
common services and engage in self-regulation. On the other hand, 
there is organisation at industry level, which consists of different 
types of producers involved in one production column or commodity 
chain. An industry may cut across several sectors. The size or scale of 
such an organisation may vary considerably. It may be highly selec-
tive, specific to a limited number of firms, or seek to be broadly rep-
resentative of all relevant firms. Below I will raise a number of issues 
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in relation to industrial governance as they relate to theories of local 
economic development. 
Secondly, territorial in general or local governance in particular has 
entered the scene of economic development. While two decades ago 
central government was considered to be the principal actor, this 
changed rapidly in the late eighties and early nineties. The NID and 
learning literature in particular has emphasised the role of local and 
regional governments in cluster development and in creating an inno-
vative milieu. This recognition is important but should not lead to a 
certain kind of myopia, a failure to take account of other dimensions, 
especially at industry and at national levels. In the following subsec-
tions, I will attempt to highlight some key issues in an effort to unrav-
el the governance of local economic development. 
4.2 Governance of inter-firm relations 
Three specific issues have received considerable attention in the liter-
ature on local economic development. The first relates to cornmon 
services, the second to business associations, and the third to indus-
trial policy frameworks. 
Common spet;ialist services 
For local producers to gain access to global markets, they generally 
require specialist producer services to enable them to acquire knowl-
edge about these markets (demand characteristics such as tastes and 
consumer peculiarities, marketing channels and trading practices). 
They also need these services in order to prepare their own manufac-
turing operations financially, technologically and organisationally for 
internationally competitive production. In particular management and 
workers need to learn new skills and routines and to adopt new atti-
tudes and practices. Large firms may be able to marshal the resources 
to engage in required market development and associated product 
development efforts. Small and medium enterprises, however, often 
have to gain access to external resources and rely on specialist busi-
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ness service providers to obtain market and product information, tools 
and technologies, skills etc. 
In the first main section of this essay, we learned that specialist ser-
vices are one of the (market-based) externalities to arise from agglom-
eration. However, the NID literature has stressed the crucial role of 
inter-firm cooperation in generating specialist services on a non-mar-
ket basis12. For example, Brusco, in his study of Italian industrial dis-
tricts, emphasised the role of 'real' services. In order to deal with 
changing market conditions, firms 'must make qualitative changes 
and they have to organise to get to know the market better, learn to 
use new technologies creatively ( ... ) Market forces alone are not 
enough to provide the firms of a district with the essential services 
they need' (Brusco, 1994:262). In some of the Italian districts, gov-
ernments played a prominent role in supporting the creation of these 
services. In the archetypal industrial district of Emilia Romagna, the 
regional development agency set up a network of general, sector-spe-
cific and function-specific centres to provide services to the garment 
and domestic electrical appliances sectors. These centres were man-
aged jointly' with local business associations (Cooke and Morgan, 
1994, 1998). In his studies of European and Brazilian industrial dis-
tricts Schmitz also identified the importance of joint action for com-
mon services. He emphasised the 'public or rather club good' and 
non-market character of these services. 
Reviewing the literature one may find a wide range of institutional 
modalities: i) Public provision, where public agencies provide ser-
vices such as export marketing, vocational training and technological 
research centres; ii) public-private partnerships where government, 
for example (co-)finances service centres but leaves it to the private 
sector to run them (trade representation, sector specific innovation 
centres); iii) intermediary forms of non-profit enterprise promotion 
agencies (non-membership) delivering enterprise development ser-
vices (Carvajal Foundation in Colombia, and the much quoted 
Steinbeis Foundation, Germany); iv) business associations (as in the 
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case of the footwear cluster in Brazil); v) consortia, (more or less for-
malised agreements between a limited number of firms to pool efforts 
or resources for a common purpose). Usually these are not sector 
wide but composed of self-selected groups of firms. Many examples 
may be found in the area of export marketing, credit and procurement 
and sourcing of inputs (e.g. Best, 1990); vi) formation of groups of 
firms is an even more restricted to a smaller group, and often involves 
more flexible arrangements, such as joint tendering for export orders, 
or joint procurement and sourcing of inputs. The 'Grupo Exportadora' 
in Caldas is a group of garment export firms (Helmsing, 1998b)13. 
One unresolved issue is which are the most appropriate delivery 
modalities for particular common services under what local econom-
ic conditions. Recently, Schmitz reformulated his concept of collec-
tive efficiency in an attempt to cope at least partially with this varia-
tion. He made a distinction between horizontal and vertical coopera-
tion and between bilateral and multilateral forms of inter-fIrm collab-
oration (Schmitz, 1999). This suggests that size (bilateral versus mul-
tilateral) and type of cooperation matter. Collective action theory pro-
vides additional clues. Other than size of group, it identifies the object 
of collective action and the characteristics of the object of collective 
action, the coinmon service. 
Business associations 
The diverse roles of business associations (BAs) in economic devel-
upment are increasingly recognisedl4 • Traditionally, they represent 
their members in their dealings with government and lobby for more 
favourable economic policies. They also often negotiate collective 
wage agreements with trade unions. Their other traditional function is 
a social one. A BA provides reference groups and role models for 
individual entrepreneurs and their family members. More recently, 
the emphasis shifted to two other functions, the provision of real ser-
vices and what Streeck and Schmitter (1985) called 'private interest 
governance' . The literature on NIDs as we have seen earlier, provides 
ample evidence of services, such as information; training, technology 
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and marketing. Private interest govermince refers to regulatory func-
tions performed by BAs, especially establishment of norms and stan-
dards products, best practices and codes of conduct. The associations 
can also resolve conflicts of interest between firms. 
The expanding role played by BAs may be due to several factors. 
Firstly, the transformation of the role of the state in economic devel-
opment. Neo-liberal thinking, which gained ground in the eighties 
and early nineties, induced national states to reduce their interven-
tionist economic policies. Market forces were expected to provide 
better solutions to the problems of economic growth. Since then, there 
has been a growing realisation that market responses are not auto-
matically forthcoming. This market failure may be due to a variety of 
reasons (upfront investment costs or risks are too high, demand may 
be too low, the public and 'club' good character of the necessary pro-
visions, knowledge barriers etc). To avoid the old trap of government 
failure, new forms of governance are advocated. These have in com-
mon that they are demand led, 'at arm's length', and enabling. The lat-
ter implies that governments share or delegate implementation to 
other actors. In this context, business associations are one of the key 
actors articulating the concerns and demands of producers, pooling 
resources and providing (semi-)public and 'club' goods (cf. Best, 
1990; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; Meyer Stamer, 1997; and 
Maskell et.al., 1998. 
Secondly, the globalization of economic activity has considerably 
increased the complexity of the environment in which firms operate, 
and small firms especially find it difficult to cope with the demands 
of intensified international competition. They lack the internal 
resources and the capability to monitor and respond to technological 
and market changes, and need access to specialist business services. 
As we have already seen, BAs provide such services, thus contribut-
ing to 'collective efficiency'. They constitute a crucial dimension of 
the 'institutional thiclmess' of industrial districts and are considered 
important components oflocal social capital (Amin and Thrift, 1994). 
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Thirdly, in the face of rapid technological change firms need to con-
tinuously upgrade their capabilities. Although much technological 
knowledge is codified and increasingly globally accessible, use and 
succesful adaptation to local circumstances requires crucial tacit 
lrnowledge (Maskel et. al., 1998, Raco, 1999). Tacit knowledge is 
essentially localised lrnowledge instilled in firms' TOutines and prac-
tices (embodied in workers and managers; and firm-level procedures 
and manuals) and its acquisition generally requires proximity and 
face-to-face contacts. Partly, firms can achieve this on the basis of 
their own resources, but smaller and less experienced firms need to 
draw on external resources in order to learn. BAs help to develop the 
preconditions necessary for 'collective learning' (Keeble, et.al., 
1999). They function as channels through which local producers seek 
to acquire crucial tacit knowledge for local adaptation, either directly 
or indirectly via BAs in other countries15 • Meyer-Stamer (1997) and 
Barzelay (1994) document cases of local producers in ceramic and 
marble extraction and in the building materials industry in Brazil and 
Spain· respectively. Through their business associations linking up 
with business associations in Italy, they obtained 'role models' on 
how to reorganise their industry and bring their own practices up to 
world standards. BAs may be conduits through which firms 'learn by 
interaction' (Morgan, 1997, Raco, 1999). 
Observers have noted a growing proliferation of business associations 
in developing and newly industrialising countries. For example, 
Moore imd Hamalai (1993) found that in Taiwan, which is lrnown for 
its success based on small firm driven industrialisation, 239 national 
level BAs were officially recorded (1993: 1897). My own research on 
processes of local economic restructuring has demonstrated that new 
BAs have been formed in Zimbabwe (Helmsing, 1998a) and that 
firms in Colombia have become member of various BAs at the same 
time (Helmsing, 1998b). 
Moore and Hamalai consider the liberalisation of economies and the 
loosening of controls on political expression and organisation as 
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important factors. They stress the relative ease with which firms can 
constitute associations (in comparison to workers forming unions) 
and particularly emphasise the 'collective entrepreneurial drive' on 
the part of the managers of these associations. These factors are no 
doubt important but in my view talce insufficient account of the roles 
associations perform in service provision, learning and industrial gov-
ernance. 
While associations can playa positive role, they can also be respon-
sible for a 'lock-in', in the sense that they adhere to existing routines 
and practices and are unable to change and make use of new oppor-
tunities. Success and status achieved in the past (e.g. in the era of 
import-substitution industrialisation) may cause resistance to change. 
A more political economic explanation of 'lock-in' would apply were 
the association controlled by small groups of 'interloc1dng' fIrms 
and/or families who enjoy substantial benefits from their current posi-
tions of influence and who resist loosing them when the benefits of 
change are uncertain. 
Indushialgovernance 
Michael Best has been a strong advocate of industrial policy in the 
context of new competition. In his view strategic industrial policy on 
the part of government which should have a production rather than a 
distribution'focus, seeldng to shape markets, stimulating and under-
tiling complementary investments in business support systems, and 
encouraging fIrms to develop strategic alliances. The purpose of such 
a policy would be to promote 'Schumpeterian' competition. This 
means in part, shaping markets and affecting the form that competi-
tion takes in order to enhance economic performance. This would be 
based on: i) a strong anti-trust and pro-competition policy; ii) the pro-
motion of inter-fIrm networks and of a balance between cooperation 
and competition; iii) primacy of strategy over planning whereby 
strategies are not designed by planners but in concert with industry 
leaders; and iv) not 'pic1dng winners' but adopting an open sector ori-
entation. Sector-specific policies are less prone to special interest pol-
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itics and less corrosive of the consensus and mutual responsibility 
required to develop and implement sector strategies (Best, 1990). 
Perspectives differ as to who should be part of this industrial policy 
process. Best mentions two key players (government, and business 
leaders and associations), others like Pyke and Sengenberger advo-
cate a tri-partite basis, i.e. including labour unions. 
Bennet and McCoshan (1993) go somewhat further and argue that the 
key challenge is to develop greater systems rationality between all 
actors. A national consensus of industrial priorities needs to be devel-
oped in a continuous encompassing process, which includes not only 
the key ministry concerned and national business organisations but 
also the participation of sectors and agencies providing key inputs in 
the business environment (e.g. economic, physical infrastructure). A 
key question hereby is how clusters and industrial districts can best be 
incorporated, via sector or via territory. 
Meier~Stamer (1997), discussing industrial change in Brazil, comes 
very close to Bennett and McCoshan when he argues the notion of 
'systemic competitiveness'. 'Sustained industrial competitiveness, 
rests not only on firm's capabilities (micro) and a stable macro eco-
nomic framework, but also and in particular on a tissue of supporting, 
sector-specific and specialised institutions and targeted policies 
(meso) and on governance structures that facilitate problem solving 
between state and societal actors (meta), (ibid: 369). Here, the gov-
ernment acts as coordinator, moderator and communicator in policy 
networks with fIrms, their associations, trade unions and intermediary 
organisations in science and technology and in training. Successful 
policy networks depend, among other things, on the autonomy of col-
lective actors, who are capable of resolving internal conflicts of inter..:. 
ests; have trust and a commitment to fair exchange and an orientation 
towards substantial outcomes, joint decision-making and information 
sharing. 
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4.4 Localised economic governance· 
Several trends have contributed to a localisation of economic gover-
nance. First of all, the roles of local governments have increased for 
a number of reasons. This is in itself a complex process and several 
factors are involved. Secondly, in many countries it has been realised 
that in order to make national innovation and support systems more 
responsive, they must be decentralised. 
Starting with the second trend, Bennet and McCoshan (1993) argued 
that local coordination is the key. Even though many support systems 
are nationally ·organised for reasons of scale and efficiency and can-
not be completely decentralised, implementation takes place at local 
leveL They stated that the participation of local actors and firms leads 
to a better appreciation of specific needs and problems. Networks 
must be organised locally and 'are meant to integrate vertical pro-
grammes and facilitate the flow of information about opportunities 
and about resources that need to be mobilised to seize these'. 
Networks facilitate externalities of economic decision-malting to 
become internalised by better attuning decisions to each other, and by 
preventing negative and maximising positive externalities. The 
authors distinguished various types of local economic development 
networks and examined network dynamics. They observed that the 
capacity to develop LED networks varies strongly by region, depend-
ing on the diversity of their economic structures and the level of eco-
nomic development. 
Cook and Morgan (1998) arrive at a similar conclusion but from a dif-
ferent perspective. Their main contention is that in order to become 
successful in learning and innovation, fIrms have to develop associa-
tional capacities, at the level of the firm (between managers and 
workers), at the level of inter-firm cooperation and the commodity 
chain and at the level of enterprise support systems. The main chal-
lenge is to get the interaction right between these three elements. The 
region can perform strategic enterprise support functions that cannot 
easily be done centrally. The national level is too high to cope with 
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complexity and detail, while the regional level allows for an appro-
priate incorporation of local diversity and specificity. Local gover-
nance structures must be forged which facilitate coordination and 
convergence across these three elements. 
With regard to the first trend, several factors have contributed to a 
more prominent role for local government in local economic devel-
opment. First of all, there has been a generalised and persistent trend 
towards decentralisation in the public sector, which has complex and 
multiple causes (cf Helmsing, 1996). By now, the vast majority of 
developing countries and transitional economies are engaged in 
processes of decentralisation and strengthening their local governance 
structuresJ6 • Public responsibilities have been transferred to local gov-
ernments, but usually without adequate transfer of resources. The 
need to generate more local revenues has forced the local govern-
ments to talce more interest in the economic development of their 
areas of jurisdiction. It is worth adding that the concern for local eco-
nomic development does not only derive from the need to raise rev-
enue but is also a response to the preferences of local people and 
enterprisesJ7 • Secondly, in a number of'countries new legislation has 
facilitated loc.al governments to enter in pUblic-private partnerships 
(e.g. South Africa, Uganda, Bolivia). Thirdly, changing perceptions 
on social security and poverty alleviation have made local govern-
ment more active in pursuing local employment creation (Bennett, 
1990). Fourthly, in a number of countries, national or state govern-
ments have launched support programmes to enable local govern-
ments to become more active in local econorriic development. Finally, 
in a number of countries, there have been genuine regionalist pres-
sures which may stem from political demands in response to past 
neglect, but which may also arise from the build up of local initiatives 
in association with processes of local specialisation (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1997). The industrial district literature has documented and 
given some credibility to local and regional government involvement, 
especially in relation to economic regulation, infrastructure, social 
services and housing and support services (Brusco and Righi, 1989). 
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Much in contrast to past practices at national level, local governments 
generally realise that they are but one of many players involved in 
local economic development. Most local authorities, also in relative-
ly affluent countries, spend a relatively minor fraction of their budgets 
on direct economic development support. More important, however, 
is the manner in which they discharge their main functions and realise 
their economic significance as a) a source of economic opportunity 
and b) a service enhancing or inhibiting enterprise development and 
competitiveness (Bennett and McCoshan, 1993). Many studies of 
NIDs also stress the limited role of local governments. Their initia-
tives have rarely played a decisive role in the economic develorment 
of the clusters (Schmitz, 1992 and 1995, Meyer-Stamer, 1998 and 
Visser, 1996). Cooke and Morgan define this role as follows: 'The 
[local] state is to create the conditions whereby firms, intermediary 
organisations and public agencies can engage in a self-organised 
process of interactive learning', and, ' .. the efficacy of [state] inter-
vention depenqs not only on its resources but also on the capacity of 
its interlocutors to engage in interactive learning among themselves 
and on its associational capacity with principal economic actors and 
their organisations. Its own decisions must become embedded in 
social processes of learning and policy formulation' (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998: 23). It requires awareness on the part of all actors of 
the need for· and the development of learning capacity. 
Local actors are best placed to assess their own situation and learn by 
comparing with other experiences. Learning at the regional level 
involves institutional and organisational processes. This is what 
Lawson (1999) conceptualised as a new local or regional competence. 
It requires an ability to spot signs of change; to create awareness and 
communicate it to other actors so that all understand the implications; 
and lastly, it requires a responsiveness to mobilise resources to 
address emerging problems. Essentially this is a case of collective 
learning, but now at local governance level. 
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As we saw earlier, a regional innovation system (RIS) is a support 
system in which universities, research organisations, vocational train-
ing agencies, technological transfer institutions and financial institu-
tions interact with local industries. This creates greater systemic 
rationality, and is capable of generating substantial efficiencies in the 
enterprise support system, by reducing policy mismatches and by cre-
ating greater convergence in complementary investment and support 
programmes. Regional innovation systems do not necessarily imply 
more resources but seek to use existing resources in a more coherent 
fashion. Small and medium-scale firms are the principal beneficiaries 
of such support systems. 
The RIS, if properly structured, can contribute to collective learning 
at the level of local and regional policy coordination. It can assist in a 
social and economic intelligence function by contributing to three 
feedback loops (Cooke and Morgan, 1998): a) assessing the extent to 
which the economic trajectory of a region is appropriate; b) compar-
ing the regions' performance with other and 'pe.er' systems; and c) 
worldng out the implications for changes in the system in order to pre-
vent a lock-in (for example, changes in the orientation of and priori-
ties for the enterprise support, training and human resource develop-
ment). This building of a regional learning competence contributes to 
the anticipation of challenges at an early stage and as such may con-
tribute to the minimisation of local resource allocation conflicts. 
Lock-in 
As an 'area continues to specialise and organises its social institutions 
arid support systems to enhance this, it may become prone to a 'lock-
in' as it becomes progressively unable to change trajectory. 
Globalisation of trade and the growing mobility of production, 
enabling substantial and swift relocation processes makes restructur-
ing a more frequent problem of new local economic development. A 
too strong interdependence between local firms and local territorial 
institutions may in that context have disastrous consequences for 
adaptability. Since there are few case studies on such situations, there 
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is little to go by. Grabher (1993) studied lock-in in the case of the 
Ruhr region of Germany. This iron and steel and coal mining region 
was once the industrial heartland. He identified three processes: i) 
functionalloclc-in, where firms have invested so much in developing 
relationships with their current customers and suppliers that they 
resist switching (high-asset specificity) even though these relations 
have ceased to be profitable; ii) cognitive lock-in, where common 
views and perceptions have developed that have become heavily 
ingrained and inward oriented. Firms cease to look beyond their cur-
rent business and markets. iii) political 'lock-in', where the system is 
kept on course thanks to intensive and consensual political decision 
making in support of the current firms and their trajectories. For 
example, new firms, unrelated to the existing coal and steel industries, 
were kept out so as 'not to distort the local labour market'. Training 
and support systems stayed focussed on these activities, at the 
expense of developing new ones. It worked but brought the system to 
a dead-end (Grabher, 1993). This is a general illustration of the point 
that industrial and territorial governance structures may be a source of 
additional higher level competence, enhancing the local capability of 
firms and support systems, but they also may become a contributing 
factor towards lock-in and recession. 
5. Final observations 
The creation of local externalities has become an area of policy. Firms 
in localities and regions which have generated positive externalities 
and reduced negative externalities have an advantage over others 
located elsewhere. External economies continue to figure but the 
source and weight has shifted. At first, the emphasis was on market-
based external economies, initially those associated with production, 
and later those originating in the transaction sphere. However, more 
recently, non-traded interdependencies have gained more in signifi-
cance. These include: a) common services organised by joint action; 
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b) norms and standards, and codes of conduct arranged through pri-
vate interest governance; c) the importance of tru$t and social embed-
dedness of networks. In all, grounded institutions that complement 
and organise markets constitute a (non-tradable) territorially specific 
asset: a localised capability (Maskell et.a!., 1998). 
Evolutionary perspectives and the premises of the 'knowledge-based' 
economy have introduced a new local dimension. The learning per-
spective on regional policy aims at change and restructuring, and 
seeks to augment the ability of firms, industries, clusters and regions 
to accumulate and utilise lmowledge (Raco, 1999). It enhances a mul-
titude of competences in both private and public institutions and pro-
motes the integration of such lmowledge. Collective learning is a new 
resource for firms. Spatial proximity plays a role, alongside organisa-
tional and cultural proximity. It takes place through inter-firm coop-
eration, through the labour market and mobility of workers, and 
through spin-offs into new firms. Collective learning is characterised 
by externalities, spillovers and non-market exchanges of information 
and skills. 
Collective learning also refers to the interaction between firms and 
territorial institutions that regulate and/or are responsible for support 
systems like training centres, universities, information and techno-
logy institutes, and other specialist services. Networking, greater sys-
tems rationality and convergence in their investment and delivery pro-
grammes may constitute another source of local advantage. It is 
important to stress here that this does not refer only to local institu-
tions but also to decentralised sector, industry and national agencies. 
The participation of key stalceholders may generate new forms of 
local economic governance. These may consist of public or private 
ones, as well as partnerships. In many countries there has been a ver-
itable explosion of differently constituted local economic develop-
ment agencies, fora, platforms, commissions etc, that play a role in 
coordination, promotion and support. Specialisation and localised 
learning may thus lead to the development of new tailor-made iristi-
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tutions, which in their turn enhance local capabilities. The broadening 
of the local institutional base is one of the central messages on local 
economic development (Amin, 1999). 
These features come close to what Maillat (1998) argued in relation 
to the innovative milieu. He stressed the importance of involving 
local players and the development of localised synergies leading to 
new endowments or (non-physical) territorial resources. Synergies 
may compensate for the lack of local economies of scale, cut transac-
tion costs and develop specific and collective territorial resources (in 
the form of know-how, specific technologies, products and process-
es). 
The initial focus may be on particular concentrations of products and 
industries (clusters), but what matters in the end are 'deeper' local 
regional competences. These include new firm formation (start-ups) 
and upgrading, the associative capacity of firms, labour mobility and 
the development of local human resources, synergy between econom-
ic activities, the 'thickness' of local institutions and of support sys-
tems, and the convergence in their programmes. There is path depen-
dence. The ability to acquire new competences often involves 
'unlearning' old competences. 
The concern for local externalities, collective learning and local gov-
ernance should not divert attention away from the wider context in 
which local firms and institutions are situated. Local economic devel-
opment implies linking up with new trends and opportunities. 
Learning thus requires exposure to new knowledge. The role of 
national and regional innovation systems, consisting of public agen-
cies, business associations and intermediary organisations, is to dif-
fuse this knowledge to local firms, clusters and related institutions 
and to enable them to malce sense of global changes. 
The local context for local economic development policy in the South 
is quite different from the one prevailing in the North. Earlier we 
noted the large differentiation of clusters. We have also looked at col-
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lective learning in the South. Finns are locked into 'old' routines 
associated with import substitution and operate in an environment 
which is economically, socially and politically not particularly con-
ducive to collective learning or to the adoption of institutional inno-
vations associated with NIDs and innovative milieus. Few regions 
and clusters will meet the necessary preconditions for externalities to 
emerge. In many countries economic development will become even 
more uneven in geographical terms. 
Is there in such a context a case for an interregional policy? The goal 
of spatial redistribution would seem more remote than ever. 
Externalities and collective learning imply spatial concentration. 
Specialisation and its associated institutional endowments enhance 
this even more. Previous generations of regional policy were 
premised on the idea that private investment could compensate for 
regional disadvantage. This paper has given additional theoretical 
arguments that this would be unrealistic. It would be even more diffi-
cult to catch up and to brealc circular and cumulative causation. The 
case for an interregional policy would rest on two arguments. Firstly, 
a region may become overspecialised and subject to an economic cri-
sis when its e~onomic base is undermined by changes in demand. As 
also argued by Krugman, intergovernmental transfers may help the 
region to restructure and find a new economic base. The aim of such 
a policy would be to enable the region concerned to develop new 
skills and renew finn-level and area-level competences for a new eco-
nomic base. This would amount to area-specific policies rather than 
blanket or general policies (cf Maskell et.al., 1998). A second argu-
ment in favour of interregional policy is social. Many regions are and 
wiil continue to be excluded from economic development. There are 
various kinds of arguments in favour of social policy: political as well 
as those derived from principles of social justice. 
To summarise the discussion, it would be fair to say iliat we are mov-
ing towards a new generation of local and regional policies. This new 
generation of policies is, on the one hand, a response to the further 
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study and evaluation of endogenous regional development and poli-
cies through NIDs and based on new perspectives of collective learn-
ing. On the other hand, they result from the recognition that globali-
sation makes territorial production systems and not just companies 
compete with each other. This means that new policies cannot be 
exclusively local but must talce into account the position and the posi-
tioning of territorial production systems within a local-global context. 
Furthermore, recent experiences have indicated that policies cannot 
be exclusively local or regional, to the point of excluding sectoral and 
(inter)national policies and contexts. Horizontal coordination among 
a range of actors needs to be complemented by vertical coordination 
between levels. The new generation of policies is premised on the 
recognition that new policies need not necessarily require more 
resources but seek to enhance governance and 'systemic rationality' 
in the use of existing resources and programmes. New policies super-
sede the opposition between exogenous and endogenous development 
policies. 
New generation policies emphasise systemic competitiveness and 
governance. While older generations of policies focused on the 
actions by firms and inter-firm cooperation from within, new policies 
add to that the importance of the local institutions. Territorial produc-
tion systems need not be restricted to clusters of small firms, as in 
many of the 'early' industrial district studies. Asymmetric network 
configurations of large and small firms can be effective and efficient 
and may be a faster route for small firms to acquire innovation and 
competitiveness. In contrast to older generations of policy, new poli-
cies stress the importance of networking among support institutions to 
achieve greater systemic rationality in the overall effort. Industrial 
governance systems have to become multi-level in order to achieve 
this. The key to the success of particular industrial localities and 
regions is how well they manage their respective external nexus and 
are able to mobilise (inter)national and sector support. 
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Finally, and with regard to my opening remarks on function and ter-
ritory, we may conclude that the literature on local and regional devel-
opment over the past 15 years has re-affirmed the territorial embed-
ding of economic development. It is not a question of either function 
or territory, as Friedmann posed it. The central question is the degree 
to which functional organisations draw on various forms of territorial 
organisation, and benefit from a range of agglomeration advantages. 
For small organisations, like SMEs, territorial organisation constitutes 
an additional resource potential. In that context, the fundamental 
question still remains that some territories have greater local capabil-
ities than others. 
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Endnotes 
1 With this model Krugman shows that an open competitive labour 
market is more efficient than a captive labour force in a company 
town (Krugman, 1991). 
2 In the mid-seventies Jos Hilhorst conceptualised the advantages of 
having a head start, which he contrasted with Hirschmann's advan-
tage of a late comer, at the occasion of the opening lecture of the 
conference organised by the ISS in 1976 on UNCTAD IV. 
3 In the late eighties and early nineties flexible specialisatio:fl had 
two major branches. The North American literature had an empha-
sis on regional production systems and has stronger roots in the 
regional science tradition of aggregate sector and linkage analysis. 
The Northern European and development studies branch, has a 
greater focus on clusters and on industrial organisation. 
4 NIDs are characterised as geographical and sectoral concentra-
tions of firms. They have a predominance of SMEs. The features 
of their industrial organisation are vertical disintegration at the 
firm level and related subcontracting, cooperation and competi-
tion. Last but not least, they have a common heritage and socio-
cultural institutions and an active self-help organisation. 
5 This is not restricted to developing countries. Malmberg (1996) 
reviewed evidence on the importance of local production linkages 
in clusters in OECD countries and found their significance in clus-
tering to be far from clear. 
6 These contrasts have been subject of two interesting contributions, 
of Martin and Sunley (1996) and Boddy, (1999). Krugman seems 
to communicate primarily with fellow mono-disciplinary econo-
mists and on occasion speaks in a rather patronising manner about 
the work of (new) economic geographers (Martin and Sunley, 
1996). His coverage of the economic geography and location the-
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ory literature is highly selective and refers primarily to (neo)-clas-
sical location theory. His focus is on modelling the interaction 
between trade and location, including only those variables than 
can be modelled with existing and new modelling techniques. 
These models are based on deductive reasoning from key assump-
tions, mostly from highly simplified accounts of the real world. 
The NID literature and economic geographers in general have 
abandoned such restrictive deductive formal modelling and work 
in a more discursive manner, involving key overall concepts. 
7 Krugman argues that there are three policy considerations. The 
first is never to specialise completely. Second, have built in sta-
bilisers via intergovernmental transfers and, lastly, emphasise the 
capacity to adjust, through retraining, retooling, and generation of 
new industries. Migration of labour is another adjustment 
response. In a later section we will return to the policy implica-
tions. 
8 Martin and Sunley are correct when they conclude that Krugman 
appears to be much closer to Michael Porter than his criticisms of 
competitive advantage seem to suggest. 
9 Camagni defined the milieu as 'a set of territorial relationships 
encompassing in a coherent way a production system, different 
economic and social actors, a specific culture and a representation 
system and generating a dynamic collective learning process' . 
10 Asheim does not give this third dimension much attention, and he 
is rather critical of the innovative milieu concept, which he con-
siders too static and too much oriented to local territorial relations. 
11 This complexity also helps to explain why different local actors 
often hold different views as to what constitute their own specific 
local advantages. Few would have a grounded understanding of all 
relevant aspects and their inner workings, most have partial 
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knowledge only. The more tacit elements, the more difficult it is to 
imitate (Maskell et al. 1998). 
12 In contrast to the NID literature, Best emphasised sector-specific 
common services, so-called 'sector institutions': 'A sector can 
include a vruiety o~ inter-fIrm practices and extra-fIrm agencies 
such as trade associations, apprenticeship programmes, labour 
education facilities, joint-marketing arrangements and regulatory 
commissions, each of which facilitates inter-firm cooperation' 
(ibid: 17). In other words, 'firms not only compete, but they can 
also cooperate to provide common [business] services, to shape 
"the rules of the game" and to shape complementary investIDent 
strategies' (ibid). 
13 In addition to these non-market forms, there are of course also 
market-based service providers: domestic private suppliers and 
buyers in the commodity chain and private consultant firms, e.g. 
in marketing, technology transfer, training and HRD, etc. 
Equipment suppliers are often alleged to be an important source of 
innovation and learning. Last but not least, and especially in the 
context of global commodity chains, global buyers and export 
trade intermediaries constitute a special category (Schmitz and 
Knorringa, 1999). 
14 Business associations can talce a variety offorms (Levitzlcy, 1993, 
1994). They may be fully privately constituted and based on vol-
untary membership. At the other extreme, they may be semi-pub-
lic with compulsory membership. BAs may be general or multi-
sectoral, sectoral or functional (that is, related to a particular func-
tion or activity, like export marketing). Alternatively, they may be 
territorially constituted (like chambers of commerce or city or 
regional business associations). Some BAs are indeed small while 
others are very large measured in terms of members or in terms of 
budgets. Small firms sometimes organise themselves in separate 
organisations. This may be by design, when their members seek 
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greater autonomy and voice, or by default when larger firms keep 
them out (formally, through entry requirements, or informally). In 
other instances, small firms are and prefer to be part of wider asso-
ciations as these wield more influence and or provide more spe-
cialised services. 
15 Public organisations can serve as a conduit for codified knowledge 
but have inherent disadvantages in providing the tacit lmowledge 
relevant to firms. 
16 Of the 75 developing countries with more than 5 million people, 
63 are pursuing decentralisation policies that devolve functions 
and responsibilities to local governments (Lee and Roberts, 1999). 
17 Lee and Roberts (1999) report the case of the World Bank financed 
municipal development fund pilot project in The Philippines in 
which almost all 'local authorities had presented and implemented 
investment proposals to improve public markets. I found similar 
indications in the case of Bolivia. 
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